Berlin school sorting

Bernd Beber, Lennard Naumann, Macartan Humphreys

1 Motivation

1.1 Schools sorting: Logics

Do parental school switching decisions worsen between-group inequalities?

Background expectations: parental choice leads to increased segregation and increased inequality in school access

1. Segregation logic:

  • classic: even moderate individual preferences to be within “ingroups” can lead to extreme segregation

2. Moving to opportunity (Counter logic)

  • all parents wish to send students to better performing schools; identity used as a proxy

1.2 What we find

There is inequality in ability to move.

But shifts appear to:

  1. reduce segregation and
  2. reduce inequality

2 Setting and data

2.1 Parental choices

Berlin school system

  • students assigned based on small catchment zones
  • can request a change: select up to three alternatives, with explanation
  • requests approved or not
  • students stay in or exit system (e.g. private, or change Berzirk)

2.2 Parental choices: forms

2.3 Parental choices: data

We have data for every entering student with basic information from these forms for Tempelhof-Schöneberg for 2009 - 2018

  • Assigned school
  • Change request
  • Change preferences (1, 2, 3)
  • School ultimately attended
  • Street address (not house number or demographic information)

2.4 Parental choices: snapshot

Change requests are in fact remarkably common (and constant over time)

2.5 Schools in Tempelhof-Schöneberg

2.6 School quality

2.7 School quality snapshot

2.8 Official school data

  • As available to parents: includes school demographics, location, languages, absentees, …

2.9 Official school data snapshot

2.10 Official school data snapshot

Suggestive of increasing bimodality (though can also be explained by residential segregation)

2.11 Demographics data

From Berlin Kommunalstatistik department, imputed to street / plz level.

year strname plz likely_migrant
2013 Aachener Straße 10713 0.4835143
2013 Aalemannufer 13587 0.2924586
2013 Aarauer Straße 12205 0.1128205
2013 Aarberger Straße 12205 0.4786325
2013 Abbestraße 10587 0.6486486
2013 Abendrotweg 12307 0.0333333

3 Major patterns

We are not seeing

  1. Increased access inequality
  2. Increased segregation

as a result of parental choices and bureaucratic responses to them

We seem to be seeing the opposite!

3.1 Outcomes 1: Increased segregation?

Estimated share migrants in class in assigned and actual schools, given own identity.

3.2 Outcomes 2

Inequality in access appears to go down (eliminated)

Relationship between demography and quality of assigned, requested, and actual school

  • There is a negative correlation between ‘likely migrant’ and the school score of the assigned school
  • But, there is a positive correlation between ‘likely migrant’ and the school score of the requested school
  • And in the end, there is zero correlation between ‘likely migrant’ and the school score of the actual school

3.3 Joint shifts

Do actual movements produce more segregation?

4 Causal analysis? RDD results

  • Is a parent more likely to seek a switch if they are very very close to a catchment zone with a more German school compared to a neighbor just inside that zone?

  • Causal effect: of having a school with given features (not: effect of these features)

4.1 RDD results: All (demography)

4.2 RDD results: By subgroup

4.3 RDD results: All (quality)

4.4 RDD results: By subgroup

4.5 RDD summary

  • Evidence that all types are, on average, likely to move to more German school
  • Evidence that all types are, on average, likely to move to a higher scoring school
  • Little difference for migrants / natives
  • However we are not capturing yet the general relations between both quality and demography on decisions

5 Matching results

5.1 Overall pattern

Migrant kids in nongerman schools are:

  • requesting transfers to German schools at lower rates
  • less successful in their applications
  • nevertheless transferring in higher numbers

5.2 Success differentials

Conditioning on the same from and to schools in a given year:

  • A shift from 25% to 75% in our ‘likely migrant’ measure is associated with a reduced likelihood of a successful request of 22 percentage points.

5.3 Success differentials

Condition on the same from and to schools in a given year:

[Recall likely migrant range is not full 0-1 range]

6 Explanation

Lets make sense of all this

We run a statistical model of multinomial choice taking account of:

  • quality and demography simultaneously
  • all options in neighborhood of each parent

We essentially ask: given all available options, when do parents choose to make a request of any one option.

6.1 Choices model

we find:

  • all parents place weight on demography and quality

  • “likely migrants” put relatively less weight on demography and more on quality

  • net effects is that

    • migrants move to quality
    • all move to demography but there are more migrants moving out
    • reduction in polarization and inequality

7 Discussion

7.1 Limitations

  • Geographic scope small
  • Identity data is imputed
  • Migrant / Nonmigrant categories too coarse: “Homophily” among migrants stretches concept
  • Quality data cannot capture all dimensions of quality

7.2 Implications

  • Story is positive despite institutional inequalities: in initial assignments and responses to requests
  • For all that: still high levels of segregation
  • Possible that native discrimination is costly on its own terms

7.3 Questions we have

  1. Are results surprising to you? Or are these patterns well known in the city?
  2. Are the results credible? Or which parts appear questionable?
  3. For what policies might these findings salient?
  4. Do we expect these findings will be well received of create controversy?
  5. We are aware of data weaknesses. Do you have pointers for improvements?
  • scope: T/S only
  • migrant coding and coarse categories
  • lacking qualitative data on school change requests
  • imperfect measures of school quality

8 Additional slides

8.1 Model details

Table 1: Models of individual choice
Statistical models
  Model 1
Migrant × Quality (from) -0.016**
  (0.006)
Migrant × Quality (to) 0.011*
  (0.004)
Migrant × Migrant school (from) -0.086***
  (0.015)
Migrant × Migrant school (to) 0.145***
  (0.016)
R2 0.028
Adj. R2 0.028
Num. obs. 377472
RMSE 0.143
N Clusters 320