

Comparative Politics Field Seminar I: Fall 2013

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1 Expectations

This is the first of the two sequence comparative politics field seminar. The seminar is primarily targeted at first and second year PhD students in the department of political science. This first part in the sequence focuses on the (often micro) building blocks of comparative political analysis and (largely) macro political outcomes. The course has two objectives. One is to expose you to leading work in the field. For the most part the readings focus on research that is innovative and strong. The second is to train you to think like a comparativist, honing your skills in analytical reading and critique. The second course in the sequence (taught by Tim Frye) takes this material as given and focuses on topics such as party structures, electoral rules, clientelism, and bureaucracy.

1.1 Requirements

Admission. To do now: Fill up this form before Wednesday 4 September midnight; you will not be admitted if you do not complete this form by midnight Tuesday 4 September: <http://tinyurl.com/CP2013SS>. Note that the target size for the class is 16 and there will be a hard cap of 18. Priority is given to PhD students in political science.

1.1.1 Reading and arguing [25%]

The Syllabus lists both required reading and further reading. You will be expected to have completed all the required readings before class *to the point where you can be called on to critique or defend any reading at any time*. You should contribute actively and be engaged in the discussion at *all* times. If the discussion does not make sense to you then stop the class and say so — it probably doesn't make sense to others either. Any computer use should be for note taking only and quick checking of facts directly related to class discussion; emailing, browsing, SMSing etc are strictly not allowed and you will be asked to withdraw if you wander like that.

1.1.2 Writing [75%]

You will write three papers that engage with readings or topics of the course. Each paper will be no more than 3000 words in length and count for 25% of your final grade. Topics will be provided in advance. These topics will be similar in nature to the sort of topics that you will see on comps exams. you should be prepared to move well beyond the readings of the class to address them. Each paper will be followed by a discussion with the instructor in which you will be asked to defend or expand on ideas provided in your written answers.

Table 1: Short paper schedule

Question provided	Due	Meeting with Instructor	Signup link
17-Sep	1-Oct	7-Oct	http://doodle.com/wcqqb9vfgw65rysy
22-Oct	5-Nov	13-Nov	http://doodle.com/k86havv732f76rwh
26-Nov	10-Dec	16-Dec	http://doodle.com/uiutktdhnsapymgd

1.2 Really Reading

The reading loads are not especially heavy but some of the readings are hard. You should aim to read them carefully and reflectively. Before approaching each reading think about what the key questions are for the week and about how the questions from this week relate to what you know from previous weeks. Then skim over the reading to get a sense of the themes it covers, and, before reading further, jot down what questions you hope the reading will be able to answer for you. Next, read the introduction and conclusion. This is normally enough to get a sense of the big picture. Ask yourself: Are the claims in the text surprising? Do you believe them? Can you think of examples of places that do not seem consistent with the logic of the argument? Is the reading answering the questions you hoped it would answer? If not, is it answering more or less interesting questions than you had thought of? Next ask yourself: What types of evidence or arguments would you need to see in order to be convinced of the results? Now read through the whole text, checking as you go through how the arguments used support the claims of the author. It is rare to find a piece of writing that you agree with entirely. So, as you come across issues that you are not convinced by, write them down and bring them along to class for discussion. Also note when you are pleasantly surprised, when the author produced a convincing argument that you had not thought of. In all cases when it is possible you are encouraged to download this data, replicate results and use it to probe and test the arguments you bring to class.

Note all readings are available on line or on courseworks but you are still encouraged to but all books marked with a ♠. Note also that all numbered readings (above the line) are required; all bulleted readings (below the line) are (strongly) recommended.

1.3 Really Critiquing

Here is a checklist of questions to ask yourself as you prepare to critique a piece.

Summarize the positive

- Try to articulate succinctly what you know now that you didn't know before you read the piece. Often a quick summary can draw attention to strong features you were not conscious of, or makes you realise that what you were impressed by is not so impressive after all.

Theory

- Is the theory internally consistent?
- Is it consistent with past literature and findings?
- Is it novel or surprising?
- Are elements that are excluded or simplified plausibly unimportant for the outcomes?
- Is the theory general or specific? Are there more general theories on which this theory could draw or contribute?

From Theory to Hypotheses

- Is the theory really needed to generate the hypotheses?
- Does the theory generate more hypotheses than considered?
- Are the hypotheses really implied by the theory? Or are there ambiguities arising from say non-monotonicities or multiple equilibria?
- Does the theory specify mechanisms?
- Does the theory suggest heterogeneous effects?

Hypotheses

- Are the hypotheses complex? (eg in fact 2 or 3 hypotheses bundled together)
- Are the hypotheses falsifiable?
- Are mechanisms implied by the hypotheses?

Evidence I: Design

- External validity: is the population examined representative of the larger population of interest?
- External validity: Are the conditions under which they are examined consistent with the conditions of interest?
- Measure validity: Do the measures capture the objects specified by the theory?
- Consistency: Is the empirical model used consistent with the theory?
- Mechanisms: Are mechanisms tested? How are they identified?
- Replicability: Has the study been done in a way that it can be replicated?
- Interpretation: Do the results admit rival interpretations?

Evidence II: Analysis and Testing

- Identification: are there concerns with reverse causality?
- Identification: are there concerns of omitted variable bias?
- Identification: does the model control for pre treatment variables only? Does it control or does it match?
- Identification: Are poorly identified claims flagged as such?
- Robustness: Are results robust to changes in the model, to subsetting the data, to changing the period of measurement or of analysis, to the addition or exclusion of plausible controls?

- Standard errors: does the calculation of test statistics make use of the design? Do standard errors take account of plausibly clustering structures/differences in levels?
- Presentation: Are the results presented in an intelligible way? Eg using fitted values or graphs? How can this be improved?
- Interpretation: Can no evidence of effect be interpreted as evidence of only weak effects?

Evidence III: Other sources of bias

- Fishing: were hypotheses generated prior to testing? Was any training data separated from test data?
- Measurement error: is error from sampling, case selection, or missing data plausibly correlated with outcomes?
- Spillovers / Contamination: Is it plausible that outcomes in control units were altered because of the treatment received by the treated?
- Compliance: Did the treated really get treatment? Did the controls really not?
- Hawthorne effects: Are subjects modifying behavior simply because they know they are under study?
- Measurement: Is treatment the only systematic difference between treatment and control or are there differences in how items were measured?
- Implications of Bias: Are any sources of bias likely to work for or against the hypothesis tested?

On Policy Implications, if any

- Do the policy implications really follow from the results?
- If implemented would the policy changes have effects other than those specified by the research?
- Have the policy claims been tested directly?
- Is the author overselling or underselling the findings?

Avoid vacuous criticisms

- I don't like it
 - It feels wrong
 - It's answering the wrong question
 - It left out a variable
 - The model is too simple. That's not how the world is.
- Only make criticisms like these if you can substantively articulate why it matters

Be creative

- Think through what could be done to improve the analysis.

2 Readings

2.1 Approaches

2.1.1 03 Sept: Causal Inference, Theory, Cases

1. ♠ A.S. Gerber and D.P. Green. *Field Experiments: Design, Analysis, and Interpretation*. W W Norton & Company Incorporated, 2012. ISBN 9780393979954. URL <http://books.google.com/books?id=yxEGywAACAAJ> Chapter 2.
2. Macartan Humphreys and Alan Jacobs. *Mixing Methods: A Bayesian Unification of Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*. *Working Paper*, 2013. URL <http://www.columbia.edu/~mh2245/papers1/BIQQ.pdf>

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- Evan S. Lieberman. Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research. *American Political Science Review*, 99(03):435–452, 2005. doi: 10.1017/s0003055405051762. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30038950>
 - ♠ Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. *Designing Social Inquiry*. Princeton University Press, New Jersey, May 1994. ISBN 0691034710
 - Barbara Geddes. How the cases you choose affect the answers you get: Selection bias in comparative politics. *Political Analysis*, 2(1):131–150, 1990. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23317768>
 - Elizabeth Woods. Field research. In Charles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, editors, *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, pages 123–146. Oxford University Press, 2009
 - J. Gerring and R. McDermott. An experimental template for case study research. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(3):688–701, 2007. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4620092>

2.1.2 10 Sept: Individuals, preferences, and systems

1. John C Harsanyi. Advances in understanding rational behavior. *Foundational Problems in the Special Sciences*, 1:315, 1977 (also reprinted in ♠ Jon Elster, *Rational Choice*)
2. Kenneth J. Arrow. Methodological Individualism and Social Knowledge. *The American Economic Review*, 84(2):1–9, 1994. ISSN 00028282. doi: 10.2307/2117792. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2117792>
3. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman. Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions. *The Journal of Business*, 59(4), 1986. ISSN 00219398. doi: 10.2307/2352759. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2352759>

4. Ann Swidler. Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies. *American Sociological Review*, 51(2):273–286, 1986. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2095521>
5. Jeffery J Mondak, Matthew V Hibbing, Damarys Canache, Mitchell A Seligson, and Mary R Anderson. Personality and civic engagement: An integrative framework for the study of trait effects on political behavior. *American Political Science Review*, 104(1):85–110, February 2010. URL <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=7449400>
6. James H. Fowler and Darren Schreiber. Biology, Politics, and the Emerging Science of Human Nature. *Science*, 322(5903):912–914, November 2008. doi: 10.1126/science.1158188. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1158188>

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- Karl W. Deutsch. Social Mobilization and Political Development. *The American Political Science Review*, 55(3):pp. 493–514, 1961. ISSN 00030554. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1952679>
 - Ronald Inglehart. Globalization and postmodern values. *The Washington Quarterly*, 23(1):215–228, Winter 2000. URL https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/washington_quarterly/v023/23.1inglehart.html

2.2 Groups

2.2.1 17 Sept: Collective Action and Political Coalitions

1. ♠ Ken A. Shepsle and Mark S. Bonchek. *Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions*. W. W. Norton, 1 edition, December 1996. ISBN 0393971074. URL <http://www.worldcat.org/isbn/0393971074>, chapters 8&9
2. Macartan Humphreys. Coalitions. *Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.*, 11:351–386, 2008. URL http://www.columbia.edu/~mh2245/papers1/arps_coalitions.pdf
3. David A. Siegel. Social networks and collective action. *American Journal of Political Science*, 53(1):122–138, 2009. ISSN 1540-5907. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00361.x. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00361.x>
4. David Cameron. Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labor Quiescence, and the Representation of Economic Interest in Advanced Capitalist Society. In John H. Goldthorpe, editor, *Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism*, pages 143–178. Clarendon Press, 1984
5. Timur Kuran. Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989. *World Politics*, 44(1):7–48, 1991. ISSN 00438871. doi: 10.2307/2010422. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2010422>

- Daron Acemoglu, Georgy Egorov, and Konstantin Sonin. Dynamics and stability of constitutions, coalitions, and clubs. Working Paper 14239, National Bureau of Economic Research, August 2008. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/w14239>
- Mark Granovetter. Threshold Models of Collective Behavior. *American Journal of Sociology*, 83(6):1420–1443, 1978. ISSN 00029602. doi: 10.2307/2778111. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2778111>
- Jon X Eguia. Endogenous parties in an assembly. *American Journal of Political Science*, 2011. URL <http://as.nyu.edu/docs/I0/4823/epa10feb22.pdf>
- Peter A. Hall and David. Soskice. *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage*. Oxford University Press, 2003. ISBN 9780191647703

2.2.2 24 Sept: Identity

1. Rogers Brubaker. Ethnicity without groups. *Archives Europeennes de Sociologie*, 43(2): 163–189, 2002. URL <http://search.proquest.com/docview/60454710?accountid=10226>
2. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin. Explaining Interethnic Cooperation. *The American Political Science Review*, 90(4):715–735, 1996. ISSN 00030554. doi: 10.2307/2945838. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2945838>
3. Seymour M Lipset and Stein Rokkan. Cleavage structure, party system and voter alignments: An introduction. In Seymour M Lipset and Stein Rokkan, editors, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*. Free Press, 1967
4. Evan Lieberman. Ethnic politics, risk, and policy-making: A cross-national statistical analysis of government responses to hiv/aids. *Comparative Political Studies*, 40(12): 1407–1432, December 2007. URL <http://cps.sagepub.com/content/40/12/1407.short>
5. Raghavendra Chattopadhyay and Esther Duflo. Women as policy makers: Evidence from a randomized policy experiment in india. *Econometrica*, 72(5):1409–1443, 2004. ISSN 1468-0262. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00539.x. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3598894>

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 - Robert H Bates. Ethnicity and development in africa: A reappraisal. *The American Economic Review*, 90(2):131–134, 2000
 - Moses Shayo. A Model of Social Identity with an Application to Political Economy: Nation, Class, and Redistribution. *American Political Science Review*, 103(02):147–174, 2009. doi: 10.1017/s0003055409090194. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27798495>

2.3 Institutions

2.3.1 01 Oct: Institutions

1. H. Peyton Young. The economics of convention. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 10(2):105–122, 1996. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2138484>
2. William H. Riker. Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions. *The American Political Science Review*, 74(2):432–446, 1980. ISSN 00030554. doi: 10.2307/1960638. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1960638>
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5. Peter C. Ordeshook and Olga V. Shvetsova. Ethnic heterogeneity, district magnitude, and the number of parties. *American Journal of Political Science*, 38(1):100–123, February 1994. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2111337>

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 - John D. Huber. The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies. *The American Political Science Review*, 90(2):269–282, 1996. ISSN 00030554. doi: 10.2307/2082884. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2082884>
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 - Paul A. David. Clio and the Economics of QWERTY. *The American Economic Review*, 75(2):332–337, 1985. ISSN 00028282. doi: 10.2307/1805621. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1805621>
 - Rohini Pande. Can mandated political representation increase policy influence for disadvantaged minorities? theory and evidence from india. *The American Economic Review*, 93(4):1132–1151, September 2003. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3132282>

2.3.2 08 Oct: The state

1. Mancur Olson. Dictatorship, democracy, and development. *American Political Science Review*, 87(3):567–576, September 1993. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2938736>

2. Peter B. Evans. Predatory, Developmental, and Other Apparatuses: A Comparative Political Economy Perspective on the Third World State. *Sociological Forum*, 4(4): 561–587, 1989. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/684425>
3. Charles Tilly. *Coercion, Capital and European States: AD 990 - 1992 (Studies in Social Discontinuity)*. Wiley-Blackwell, revised edition, September 1992. ISBN 1557863687, chapter 3.
4. Cameron G Thies. War, rivalry, and state building in Latin America. *American Journal of Political Science*, 49(3):451–465, 2005. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3647725>

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- Jeffrey Herbst. *States and Power in Africa*. Princeton University Press, March 2000. ISBN 0691010285. URL <http://www.worldcat.org/isbn/0691010285>, pp. 3–59
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 - Margaret Levi. The predatory theory of rule. *Politics & Society*, 10(4):431–465, December 1981. URL <http://pas.sagepub.com/content/10/4/431.citation>
 - Carles Boix. *Democracy and Redistribution (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics)*. Cambridge University Press, July 2003. ISBN 0521532671. URL <http://www.worldcat.org/isbn/0521532671>, chapter 1.

2.4 Ways of Allocating Values

2.4.1 15 Oct: Bargaining, Deliberation, & Political Persuasion

1. James D Fearon. Rationalist explanations for war. *International organization*, 49:379–379, 1995
2. David Austen-Smith and Timothy J. Feddersen. Deliberation, preference uncertainty, and voting rules. *American Political Science Review*, null:209–217, 5 2006. ISSN 1537-5943. doi: 10.1017/S0003055406062113. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27644345>
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5. Leonard Ray. When parties matter: The conditional influence of party positions on voter opinions about European integration. *Journal of Politics*, 65(4):978–994, 2003

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 - Jon Elster. Deliberation and constitution making. In Jon Elster, editor, *Deliberative Democracy*. Cambridge University Press, 1998

2.4.2 22 Oct: Authority

1. Roger B. Myerson. The Autocrat’s Credibility Problem and Foundations of the Constitutional State. *American Political Science Review*, 102(01):125–139, 2008. doi: 10.1017/s0003055408080076. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27644502>
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3. Stephen Haber. Authoritarian government. In Barry Weingast and Donald Wittman, editors, *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*, pages 693–707. Oxford University Press, 2006
4. Beatriz Magaloni. Credible power-sharing and the longevity of authoritarian rule. *Comparative Political Studies*, 41:715 – 741, 2008/04// 2008. URL <http://m.cps.sagepub.com/content/41/4-5/715.short>
5. Edmund Malesky and Paul Schuler. Nodding or Needling: Analyzing Delegate Responsiveness in an Authoritarian Parliament. *American Political Science Review*, 104(03): 482–502, 2010. doi: 10.1017/s0003055410000250. URL http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1669709

2.4.3 29 Oct: Violence

1. Jeremy Weinstein. *Inside Rebellion*. Cambridge University Press, 2007. ISBN 9781139458696. URL <http://books.google.com/books?id=N3-pSjAWGccC> Introduction and Chapters 1 and 2.
2. J.C. Scott. *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia*. Yale University Press, 1977b. ISBN 9780300185553. URL http://books.google.com/books?id=qu5KUdN_rDkC. Chapter 7.

3. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin. Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. *The American Political Science Review*, 97(1):75–90, 2003. ISSN 00030554. doi: 10.2307/3118222. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3118222>
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- S. Autesserre. *The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding*. Cambridge Studies in International Relations. Cambridge University Press, 2010. ISBN 9780521156011. URL <http://books.google.com/books?id=IltRgvb95aIC>
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 - Christopher Blattman and Edward Miguel. Civil War. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 48(1):3–57, September 2010. doi: 10.1257/jel.48.1.3. URL <http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.48.1.3>
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5 Nov: University Holiday

2.5 Outcomes

2.5.1 12 Nov: Accountable governments

1. Martina Björkman and Jakob Svensson. Power to the people: Evidence from a randomized field experiment on community-based monitoring in uganda. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 124(2):735–769, 2009
2. Guillermo O’Donnell. Horizontal accountability in new polyarchies. *Journal of Democracy*, 9(3):112–26, 1998. URL http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v009/9.3odonnell.html
3. Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way. The rise of competitive authoritarianism. *Journal of Democracy*, 13:51–66, 04/2002 2002. URL http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/levitsky/files/SL_elections.pdf
4. Timothy Besley and Robin Burgess. The political economy of government responsiveness: Theory and evidence from india. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 117(4):1415–1451, 2002. URL <http://public.econ.duke.edu/~psarcidi/lunchf08/besburgess.pdf>

5. Claudio Ferraz and Frederico Finan. Exposing corrupt politicians: The effects of brazil's publicly released audits on electoral outcomes. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(2):703–745, 2008. URL <http://qje.oxfordjournals.org.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/content/123/2/703.full.pdf+html>

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- John Ferejohn. Accountability and authority: Toward a theory of political accountability. In Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin, editors, *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*. Cambridge University Press, 1999

2.5.2 19 Nov: Democratization and Regime Change

1. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith. Political Institutions, Policy Choice and the Survival of Leaders. *British Journal of Political Science*, 32(4):559–590, 2002. ISSN 00071234. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4092374>
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- Barrington Moore. *Social origins of dictatorship and democracy: Lord and peasant in the making of the modern world*, volume 268. Beacon Press, 2003
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 - James C Scott. *The moral economy of the peasant: Rebellion and subsistence in Southeast Asia*. Yale University Press, 1977a, chapters 1&7.
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2.5.3 26 Nov: Reform and Redistribution

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